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Abstract 
 
In 1887 Henry Carter Adams produced a study demonstrating that the ownership 
of government bonds was heavily concentrated in the hands of a ‘bondholding 
class’ that lent to and, in Adams’s view, controlled the government like domi-
nant shareholders control a corporation. The interests of this bondholding class 
clashed with the interests of the masses, whose burdensome taxes financed the 
interest payments on government bonds. Since the late nineteenth century there 
has been plenty of debate about the ownership of the public debt. But the empir-
ical evidence offered to support the various arguments has been scant. As a re-
sult, political economists have few answers to questions first raised by Adams 
over a century ago: how has the pattern of public debt ownership changed? Can 
we still speak of a powerful ‘bondholding class’? Does public debt redistribute 
income from taxpayers to public creditors? This article develops a new frame-
work to address these questions. Anchored within a ‘capital as power’ approach, 
the research indicates a staggering pattern of concentration in the ownership of 
US public debt in the hands of the top one per cent of US households over the 
past three decades. Accordingly, the bondholding class is still alive and well in 
contemporary US capitalism. 
 
Keywords: public debt, power, distribution, redistribution, bondholding class, 
inequality, top one per cent 
 
The capitalists are in a very small minority, and any legislation 
repudiating in whole or in part the obligations of the bonds of 
the government would fall most severely upon widows, orphans 
and people of small capital . . . Out of the three million sub-
scribers to our various public loans, over nine-tenths are of the 
class called the people (Jay Cooke, cited in Macdonald 2003: 
398; original emphasis) 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Debates about the ownership of the public debt have raged in the United States 
since the country gained independence from British rule. But it was only in the 
late nineteenth century that any concerted effort was made to theorise and empir-
ically map the pattern of US public debt ownership. In 1887, Henry Carter Ad-
ams published a pioneering study that examined the ‘concentration of bondhold-
ing interests’ in the US (Adams 1887: 44). Focusing specifically on household 
and corporate sector holdings, Adams (1887: 44) uncovered the ‘spectacle of a 
highly centralized public debt’. The public creditors, in Adams’s view, formed a 
powerful ‘bondholding class’ that controlled the government much like domi-
nant shareholders control a corporation. Adams (1887: 41) went on to suggest 
that the public debt reinforced a strict class division between the majority whose 
burdensome taxes financed government debt servicing, and the tiny elite of 
bondholders that received tax-financed interest payments. 
Over a century has passed since Adams produced his groundbreaking analy-
sis. And in that time there has been plenty of heated debate about the pattern of 
US public debt ownership. Some emphasise continuities with Adams’s era and 
claim that the public debt is still heavily concentrated and that interest payments 
on government bonds still redistribute income regressively from poor to rich 
(Schmid 1982; Michl 1991; Canterbery 2000). Others stress change and insist 
that the public debt has become widely held and that interest payments on gov-
ernment bonds now redistribute income progressively (Eisner 1986; Cavanaugh 
1996). The debate has become so polarised that contemporary political econo-
mists, whether ‘mainstream’ or ‘critical’, cannot agree on even the most basic 
facts concerning ownership of the US public debt and its potential redistributive 
effects. As a result, political economists have failed to give any convincing ex-
planation of what has happened to the bondholding class that Adams theorised 
and mapped over a century ago. 
My purpose in this paper is to shed much-needed light on the political econ-
omy of US public debt ownership. Theoretically, the approach that I take here 
builds upon a growing body of literature that conceptualises capitalism as a 
mode of power (Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Di Muzio 2013). This new approach 
to political economy argues that capitalist power is rooted in private ownership. 
As a process of power, the distribution of ownership is top-down; in other 
words, it is focused not on the ownership share of capital in general but on the 
dominant capitalists at the centre of accumulation. Furthermore, the power con-
ferred by ownership is both dynamic and differential. In order to gauge changes 
in power we need to analyse changes in the pattern of ownership as they unfold-
ed over time and relative to other social groups. 
Few would deny that questions concerning distribution and redistribution – in 
asking ‘who gets what?’ and also ‘who gets what at whose expense?’ – are ulti-
mately rooted in concerns over power. And these linkages between ownership 
and power are often drawn implicitly within existing studies of US public debt 
ownership. But I argue that it is only by rendering these theoretical linkages ex-
plicit that we are able to develop a set of transparent criteria and accounting 
techniques for empirically exploring the changes in the power of the bondhold-
ing class over the past century. 
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Despite the heated debate and rhetoric, the existing empirical record is 
patchy. There has been only a handful of studies that have attempted to empiri-
cally map the ownership pattern of US federal government bonds over the past 
century, and even fewer efforts to measure the redistributive effects associated 
with a given ownership pattern (see Table 1). Anchored within this new power-
centred framework, my empirical analysis offers the first systematic effort to 
map the historical dynamics of distribution and redistribution that lie at the heart 
of the public debt. Focusing specifically on the US household sector, my argu-
ment unfolds in three steps. 
First, I map the share of the public debt owned by the wealthiest one per cent 
of the US population over the past century. I show how concentration in the 
ownership of the US public debt follows the general U-shaped pattern of wealth 
and income inequality in the US. Over the past three decades or so the concen-
tration of the public debt in the hands of the top one per cent has increased at a 
rapid rate; by 2010, ownership concentration was nearly as high as it was in the 
early 1920s, the period of the highest concentration for which reliable data first 
becomes available. 
Second, I explore the redistributive consequences associated with this growth 
in inequality in the distribution of the public debt. I demonstrate how the federal 
income tax system has done little to offset the increasingly regressive pattern of 
public debt ownership. While the distribution of federal interest income has be-
come more concentrated in favour of the top one per cent over the past three 
decades, the relative federal income tax rate that the top one per cent pays rela-
tive to the average has remained steady. 
Third, I assess the claim made by some orthodox Keynesians that the intra-
governmental portion of the public debt, the debt held by the federal government 
in trust fund accounts such as social security, serves the interests of ordinary 
Americans. I argue that the distribution of government transfer payments pro-
vides an indirect measure of the interests served by the federal government’s 
holdings of its own debt. Recent data collected by the Congressional Budget Of-
fice (CBO) indicate that the top one per cent of households has never had much 
of a stake in transfer payments. But this is no reason to celebrate intra-
governmental debt as a progressive force. If we dig deeper and examine the dis-
tribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99 per cent, it becomes clear 
that over the past three decades intra-governmental debt has, if anything, intensi-
fied social inequality and polarisation. 
These observations lead me to conclude that over the past three decades the 
public debt has come to serve as an institution of power that works increasingly 
in the interests of the most affluent Americans in general and the top one per 
cent in particular. Though much has changed since Adams’s time, the analysis 
here indicates that there is indeed still a powerful bondholding class in the US; 
one whose power has augmented rapidly over the past three decades. 
The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. In the first section I 
offer a critical review of the existing literature on the political economy of pub-
lic debt ownership in the US. In the second section I develop my alternative 
framework that places power at the centre of the analysis. In the third section I 
discuss my own empirical findings following the three-step argument outlined 
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above. I then conclude with some general thoughts on the distributive and redis-
tributive dimensions of the public debt and their implications for orthodox 
Keynesianism. 
 
1. Public debt, distribution and redistribution: a survey 
 
Since the very founding of the American republic, politicians, political econo-
mists, the media and ordinary citizens have fiercely debated the distributive and 
redistributive consequences associated with public indebtedness. The original 
system of public debt, established in 1790 and based on Treasury Secretary Al-
exander Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit, drew the ire of critics who argued 
that it created a ‘new monied [sic] interest’ that produced nothing and wished 
only for ‘oppressive taxes’ (Wright 2008: 153).
1
 Robert Livingston (1790: 4), an 
early opponent of the US system of public debt, claimed that only 0.025 per cent 
of the US population owned government bonds. The inequalities in the owner-
ship of the public debt, Livingston suggested, would become a source of great 
social instability, as the taxes of the many would go to enrich the few public 
creditors (see Wright 2008: 162). 
During the American Civil War (1861–4) President Abraham Lincoln 
claimed that the large increases in the public debt would create political and so-
cial unrest unless efforts were made to ensure that government bonds were wide-
ly distributed amongst the US population.
2
 In 1865 Lincoln’s successor, Andrew 
Johnson, suggested that the country had failed to widely distribute government 
bonds and that the Northern States had instead come under the political control 
of a powerful ‘aristocracy’ of public creditors. Jay Cooke, a banker and govern-
ment loan contractor during the Civil War, vehemently denied these claims.
3
 Ac-
cording to Cooke, his campaigns to market government bonds to the masses had 
made large capitalists minority investors in the public debt. Attempts to repudi-
ate the public debt would, as far as Cooke was concerned, bring great harm to all 
of the widows, orphans and small-time investors across the US that had invested 
their meagre savings in the public debt (see opening quote). 
In the early years of the American republic these sentiments were often based 
on political expediency rather than any systematic theory. Furthermore, there 
were no attempts to subject these claims about the distributive and redistributive 
dimensions of the public debt to any rigorous empirical scrutiny. With little data 
available on the distribution of the public debt, the arguments were backed up by 
little more than rumour and conjecture. 
By the late nineteenth century, however, this all started to change. In his Pub-
lic Debts: An Essay in the Science of Finance, Henry Carter Adams (1887) de-
veloped a coherent theoretical framework for analysing the effects of public in-
debtedness on the class structure of capitalist societies. What is more, Adams 
sought to substantiate his theoretical claims through a careful empirical exami-
nation of US Census data from 1880. For the first time, the distributive and re-
distributive consequences of the US public debt were to be subjected to serious 
theoretical-empirical research. 
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From the bondholding class . . . 
 
In general terms, Adams (1887: 39) argued that the public debt could potentially 
have two separate effects on class relations within capitalist societies: it could 
either change the existing class structure or it could ‘render permanent such clas-
ses as are already established’. For Adams (1887: 41), the public debt could only 
have the latter effect because ‘private property must have been concentrated to a 
considerable degree before the borrowing system could have been developed’. 
Adams claimed that in reinforcing, rather than creating, the class divisions of 
capitalist society, the public debt enriched the ‘moneyed interest’ of wealthy 
city-dwellers and large corporations, a group he referred to collectively as the 
‘bondholding class’. This bondholding class that received interest payments on 
the public debt was distinct from the majority of taxpayers whose taxes went 
towards debt servicing (Adams 1887: 41). Given that the identities of these two 
classes are separate, Adams suggested that the act of public borrowing redistrib-
utes income from the class of taxpayers, a group he never actually defines or 
investigates, to the bondholding class. This redistributive dynamic not only rein-
forced social inequality, but paved the way for political inequality, even in dem-
ocratic societies. Through concentrated ownership of government bonds, the 
bondholding class exerts control over the government apparatus; in Adams’s 
own words, ‘. . . they lend to a corporation controlled by themselves’ (1887: 9). 
Adams (1887: 44) sought to empirically substantiate some of his theoretical 
propositions by empirically measuring the ‘concentration of bondholding inter-
ests’ in the US.
4
 His empirical research uncovered the ‘spectacle of a highly cen-
tralized public debt’ for both the US household and corporate sectors (Adams 
1887: 44). 
According to Adams’s analysis of US Census data from 1880, the top 1.4 per 
cent of individual government bondholders held approximately 48 per cent of 
the individual share of the public debt, while the top 35 per cent of corporate 
bondholders held 93 per cent of the corporate share of the public debt (1887: 
46). The data compiled by Adams appears to confirm his arguments about the 
public debt being concentrated in the hands of a ‘bondholding class’. There was 
no reason to suggest that the public debt is ‘a good thing because it permits easy 
and safe investments for the funds of those who are weak and dependent’ (Ad-
ams 1887: 47). Given the level of concentration in the hands of society’s most 
powerful elements, Adams (1887: 48) held it ‘ludicrous’ to suggest that the pub-
lic debt was maintained for the benefit of widows, orphans and other members 
of society in need. 
In many ways, the timing of Adams’s pioneering study was inopportune. In 
the late nineteenth century, the level of US public debt had declined significant-
ly. As Figure 1 indicates, the level of US public debt as a percentage of GDP fell 
from around 32 per cent in the immediate post-Civil War period to 12.6 per cent 
in 1887, the year Adams’s study was published. With the public debt in decline, 
debates about the distributive and redistributive effects of the public debt all but 
disappeared. It was not until the first half of the twentieth century, which wit-
nessed two World Wars, the Great Depression and the largest expansion of pub-
lic debt in US history, that the debates would resurface. 
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. . . to ‘John Q. Public’ 
 
Concerns about the distributive and redistributive effects of the public debt ac-
companied the rise of Keynesianism in the 1930s. With unemployment exceed-
ing 20 per cent in the US and the UK during the Great Depression, Keynes and 
his followers dismantled the unquestioning liberal faith in the self-regulating 
market and, in turn, provided the first systematic theoretical justification for ac-
tive government intervention from within the liberal tradition. Part and parcel of 
the new Keynesian ‘macroeconomics’ was to supplant the liberal faith in a doc-
trine of sound finance, which called for balanced budgets and minimised gov-
ernment borrowing, with a new approach that called on governments to spend 
and to borrow as much as was needed in order to achieve non-inflationary full 
employment. In the 1940s, two of the most prominent early Keynesians, Alvin 
Hansen and Abba Lerner, took up the task of re-thinking the role of the public 
debt within capitalist societies. 
Despite the differences and nuances in their respective frameworks, both 
Hansen (1941: 174) and Lerner (1948: 260–1) recognised that a rapidly growing 
public debt might have negative effects on income and wealth distribution. Han-
sen (1941: 179), for example, argued that lower and middle class investors could 
purchase the majority of government bonds in the event of small, gradual in-
creases in the public debt and that this would prevent any regressive effects on 
distribution. But he went on to suggest that the rich would disproportionately 
purchase government bonds in the event of large increases in the public debt and 
that this would only serve to intensify existing inequality. The negative effects 
of public debt on the distribution of wealth were in Hansen’s (1941: 179) view ‘. 
. . the most fundamental objection that can be raised against financing mainly by 
borrowing’. 
Early Keynesian theorists of the public debt were uncomfortable with the 
idea that government borrowing could potentially have such adverse effects on 
the distribution of wealth and income. Although it is never made explicit in the 
work of Hansen or Lerner, any regressive effects of a growing public debt on 
distribution would only aggravate the deficiency of ‘effective demand’ that 
Keynes had identified as the main source of instability in capitalist societies. The 
so-called ‘propensity to consume’ was, after all, much higher for those with 
lower incomes, and a pattern of distribution skewed towards top earners would, 
if unequal enough, eventually undermine, rather than enhance, the much vaunted 
‘multiplier effect’ (Dillard 1948: 102–3; Brown 2004). These dynamics, if 
pushed far enough, would eventually undermine the government’s ability to en-
gage in counter-cyclical deficit spending. 
Though they recognised the potential distributive and redistributive dynamics 
of the public debt, the early Keynesians did not believe that these dynamics were 
of much practical concern. Hansen, in an article written with Guy Greer (1942: 
497), declared unequivocally that the distribution of government bonds in the 
1940s was more equitable than at any other point in history, and that, as a result, 
it is ‘not true that the wealth represented by the [federal] bonds is mainly con-
centrated in the hands of a relatively few of the very rich’.  
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Furthermore, both Hansen (1941: 181) and Lerner (1948: 261) argued that the 
negative effects of the public debt on distribution would, within certain limits, 
be a reasonable trade-off for the attainment of full employment. Finally, both 
Hansen (1941: 179) and Lerner (1948: 261) were confident that any lingering 
distributive inequality created by the public debt could be offset through pro-
gressive taxation. 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, a pair of empirical studies sur-
faced, both of which appeared to corroborate the arguments of Hansen and Ler-
ner. Donald Miller (1950) found that, for 1945, the share of taxes paid and the 
share of federal interest income received by the top income earners in the US 
was more or less equal. This led Miller (1950: 142) to claim that the public debt 
was not an important ‘redistributive force’. In a short article, Jacob Cohen 
(1951: 267) used rough estimates to gauge the distribution of federal interest and 
federal income taxes; he declared that in 1946 the public debt actually had a ‘. . . 
distributional effect in favor of lower-income groups’. 
Later in the postwar period, much like in the late nineteenth century, the de-
bates concerning distributive and redistributive effects once again faded into the 
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Figure 1 Gross US Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Note: Gross public debt includes both 'debt held by the pubilc' and 
intra-governmental debt.  
 
Source: www.usgovernmentspending.com 
percent percent 
sbhager.tumblr.com 
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background along with substantial decreases in the public debt (see Figure 1).
5
 
Aside from various studies of wealth and income inequality in general, which 
contain traces of data on the ownership of government bonds, there were no 
stand-alone studies of the ownership of public debt and its redistributive effects 
from the 1950s through the 1970s (Lampman 1962; Smith 1974). 
But after the postwar lull, these debates have once again gained momentum. 
Since the early 1980s a growing number of political economists have become 
embroiled in a renewed debate about the distributive and redistributive dynamics 
of the public debt. On the one hand, a group of heterodox political economists 
continue to insist that ownership of the public debt is highly concentrated and 
that interest payments on government bonds redistribute income from the major-
ity of taxpayers to a tiny elite of bondholders (Schmid 1982; Michl 1991). For 
some the ‘bondholding class’ still uses its power over the government purse 
strings to influence policy in contemporary US capitalism (Canterbery 2000, 
2002). Analysing data for 1982 from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer 
Finances, Thomas Michl (1991) found that the top one per cent of the population 
ranked by gross income owned 6.2 per cent of savings bonds, 43.3 per cent of 
other Treasury issues, and estimated that the top one per cent received 22.5– 
33.3 per cent of direct and indirect interest payments and paid 11.9–14.6 per cent 
of federal taxes. The results led Michl (1991: 364) to conclude that ‘interest on 
the national debt redistributes income regressively’. 
On the other hand, orthodox Keynesians follow the line of argument first laid 
down by Hansen and Lerner. Economist Robert Eisner (1986: 42; cited in Michl 
1991: 352), for example, argued that although the rich hold the bulk of govern-
ment bonds they also pay the bulk of taxes, leading him to suggest that a ‘large 
public debt does not particularly affect the distribution of income as between 
rich and poor’. 
Francis Cavanaugh (1996: 63–8) goes even further by making a series of 
claims that purportedly dispel the ‘myth’ that the public debt creates an inequi-
table interest burden. First, he suggests that the public debt is widely held, most-
ly in savings bonds, ‘which are especially designed for people with modest sums 
to invest’. Second, he suggests that the public debt held by institutions, and es-
pecially by government trust fund accounts such as social security, largely bene-
fit ordinary Americans. Third, he cites data from a US Treasury report that sug-
gests that the interest payments on the public debt are more progressively dis-
tributed than the payment of federal taxes. This leads Cavanaugh (1996: 68) to 
conclude that there ‘. . . is no basis for the widely held view that interest on the 
public debt is paid to investors who are much wealthier than the average taxpay-
er, who gets stuck with the interest bill’. Based on these three claims, Cavanaugh 
(1996: 63) confidently asserts that the ‘principal investor in US Treasury securi-
ties is John Q. Public, not John D. Rockefeller’. 
 
2. Public debt, ownership and power 
 
Why, then, do political economists have difficulty agreeing on even the most 
basic facts concerning the ownership of the public debt and its redistributive ef-
fects? Why do some political economists insist that the public debt serves the 
interests of a powerful ‘bondholding class’, while others claim that it serves the 
  
What Happened to the Bondholding Class? 
 
 
 8 
interests of ‘John Q. Public’? 
One of the main reasons, I contend, is that, despite centuries of debate and 
discussion, the empirical record on the disaggregate ownership of the US public 
debt is patchy. Table 1 outlines the existing studies that have offered some form 
of empirical mapping of the pattern of public debt ownership and redistribution. 
At least three things stand out. First, even though data have become more readily 
accessible, existing studies have done little to improve upon the rather rudimen-
tary empirical methods developed by Adams in the late nineteenth century. Like 
Adams, the subsequent studies offer narrow ‘snapshot’ measures for single 
years.  
 
Table 1 Existing Studies of Public Debt Ownership 
Author, Date 
of Publication 
Study 
Year(s) 
 
Findings 
 
Conclusions 
Adams (1887) 
 
1880 1.4% of private investors in 
the public debt owned 
47.8% of privately held US 
federal government bonds. 
Top 35% of corporations 
hold 93% of corporate 
share.  
Revealed the ‘spectre of a 
highly centralized public debt’ 
(44).   
Miller (1950) 
 
 
1945 
 
5.31% of taxpayers in the 
top income class ($5000 or 
more) paid ca. 50-56% of 
all federal taxes and re-
ceived 58.7% of interest 
payments on the public 
debt.   
The progressivity of the feder-
al tax and public debt struc-
tures the same; the public debt 
does not redistribute income.  
 
Cohen (1951) 1946 The top income class 
($5000 or more) paid 47-
55% of all federal taxes and 
received 39% of interest 
payments.  
Public debt has distributional 
effects in favour of lower in-
come groups.  
Michl (1991) 1982, 1984 
for taxes 
Top 1% of households 
owned 6.2% of savings 
bonds, 43.3% of other 
Treasury issues, received 
22.5-33.3% of direct and 
indirect interest payments 
and paid 11.9-14.6% of 
federal taxes 
 “It seems clear that the con-
ventional textbook wisdom 
that we ‘owe to ourselves’ is 
wrong. Interest on the national 
debt redistributes income re-
gressively” (364). 
 
Cavanaugh 
(1996) 
1992 Lorenz curve for 1992 
shows that distribution of 
interest on the public debt 
more progressive than fed-
eral income taxes. 
“…the principal investor in 
U.S. Treasury securities is 
John Q. Public, not John D. 
Rockefeller” (63).   
 
 
Second, all of the subsequent studies use different methods to measure owner-
ship concentration and redistribution. This diversity makes it difficult to adjudi-
cate between their competing claims and impossible to compare their research 
results over time. Third, there has been no serious attempt to measure the pattern 
of public debt ownership and its redistributive effects since 1996.  
These empirical shortcomings, I contend, are the product of deeper theoreti-
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cal problems in the existing literature. Though the existing studies often employ 
the slogans, concepts and categories of conventional theories of political econo-
my, they make little effort to theorise in any systematic way the distributive and 
redistributive dimensions of public indebtedness. Adams comes closest in offer-
ing some theoretical framework. Even if only implicitly, Adams’s research 
draws conceptual linkages between the ownership of the public debt on the one 
hand and the exercise of social power on the other. The power of the ‘bondhold-
ing class’ implicitly rests on its concentrated holdings of federal government 
bonds. Thus the uniform quantitative architecture of distribution and redistribu-
tive is, within Adams’s work, the key indicator that is used to map the power of 
the bondholding class. 
Few would deny that issues of distribution and redistribution are inherently 
bound up with the question of power. But these power dimensions and their 
linkages to the uniform quantitative architecture of ownership are not theorised 
in existing studies. Explicitly and systematically recognising power as the uni-
versal basis of ownership allows us to develop what is sorely missing from the 
existing studies in Table 1: namely, a set of transparent and uniform conceptual 
criteria through which to map the distributive and redistributive effects of the 
public debt. 
 
Conventional theories 
 
How do we then go about integrating power into the analysis? It is not at all cer-
tain that conventional theories of political economy are equipped to help us theo-
rise and empirically map the power underpinnings of public debt ownership and 
redistribution. 
Neoclassical economics, by far the most dominant approach within liberal 
political economy, faces severe difficulties in accounting for the power relations 
underpinning debt and credit. This is because the assumptions of neoclassical 
economics place the acts of lending and borrowing money in the power-less 
‘economic’ realm of perfect competition and equilibrium (Graeber 2011: 22). In 
general terms, the only way power can enter the ‘economic’ realm of neoclassi-
cal frameworks is through the back door as a ‘distortion’ (Bichler and Nitzan 
2012a: 67).  
Marx (1867: 914–26), for his part, put power at the centre of his analysis of the 
public debt in the final section in Volume I of Capital. The development of the 
public debt, according to Marx, engendered a clear-cut conflict between the pub-
lic creditors and the masses of taxpayers. The interest payments on the public 
debt that flowed to idle rentiers, Marx (1867: 921) argued, were financed by 
over-taxation of ‘the most necessary means of subsistence’. This over-taxation 
was not accidental: for Marx (1867: 921) it was an entrenched ‘principle’ of 
public indebtedness. But Marx confined his analysis of these dynamics within 
the precapitalist context of primitive accumulation. Once the transition from 
feudalism to the advanced capitalism mode of production is completed, then the 
true conflict pits industrial workers against industrial capitalists (Marx 1867: 
921). In advanced industrial capitalism, the public debt and other forms of fi-
nance get demoted to the status of ‘fictitious’ capital (Marx 1893: 423, 1894: 
590–606). ‘Industrial’ capital embodied in the ‘means of production’ replaces 
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‘fictitious’ capital as the engine of capitalist development and the key site of 
class struggle (Bichler et al. 2012: 8). 
Taken together, the empirical and theoretical shortcomings in the existing lit-
erature suggest that there is a clean slate to rethink and research the distributive 
and redistributive dimensions of the public debt. My analysis here contributes to 
a new alternative approach to political economy that conceptualises capitalism 
as a mode of power. 
 
An alternative 
 
According to the ‘capital as power’ framework pioneered by Jonathan Nitzan 
and Shimshon Bichler (2009), finance is not a fiction and power is not merely a 
distortion. Rather, power is the primary means and ends of the process of capital 
accumulation and this power finds expression in the nominal magnitudes of fi-
nance. The institution of private ownership, which confers on owners the power 
to exclude others from using that property, represents the central power institu-
tion of capitalist societies. The exclusionary power conferred by the institution 
of ownership extends far beyond machines to anything that can be owned. 
Debates over the precise nature of the public debt, and if and how it differs in 
any fundamental way from private debt, have raged for centuries.
6
 But when 
viewed in terms of capital as power, there is one crucial aspect that unites the 
two together at their root: namely, they are both symbolic representations of a 
power relation between creditor and debtor. In particular, this relationship, codi-
fied in the legal institution of ownership, represents a claim by the creditor on 
the future earning capacity of the debtor. In the case of government bonds the 
earning capacity derives primarily from the state’s power to tax its citizenry. As 
with all other forms of private property, the power that ownership of a govern-
ment bond confers on its owner is based on the principle of exclusion. In other 
words, ownership of the public debt confers power only to the extent that others 
are excluded from using it. Framed as a guiding hypothesis, we can propose that 
the accumulation of ownership claims on the public debt by a particular group of 
bondholders augments the power of that group over society (see also Di Muzio 
2007). 
The social power conferred by ownership is top-down, relative and dynamic. 
As a top-down process, the focus here is not on capital in general but on the 
dominant capitalists: the largest corporations and wealthy individuals at the cen-
tre of the process of accumulation. As dominant capitalists augment and increase 
the market value of their ownership claims, they achieve differential accumula-
tion and augment their power relative to other social groups. And as an inherent-
ly dynamic process, the way to gauge the trajectory of capitalist power is to map 
the changes in ownership over time. 
These alternative theoretical propositions provide a conceptual basis for the 
development of alternative empirical methods and accounting techniques. A fo-
cus on relative or differential accumulation leads to the use of cut-off points that 
separate dominant capital from the wider population. The exact cut-off point that 
is chosen to represent dominant capital is always to a certain extent arbitrary. In 
my analysis here I focus on the top one per cent of households as the cut-off 
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point because it has become the focus of a wide-range of current debates about 
wealth and inequality in the US, not only for more radical movements such as 
Occupy Wall Street, but also for mainstream debates within the economics pro-
fession (Stiglitz 2012).
7
 The top one per cent will therefore serve as my proxy 
for the ‘bondholding class’. A focus on the dynamic aspects of power leads, 
where possible, to the replacement of ‘snapshots’ of ownership data with long-
term historical time-series that map the ownership pattern as it changes over 
time. 
 
3. The dynamics of distribution and redistribution 
 
Mapping distribution 
 
With this background information in place, it is now time to present my own 
efforts to map the disaggregate dynamics of distribution and redistribution that 
underpin the public debt. My alternative framework takes the institution of own-
ership as the analytical foundation for the analysis of power. As the review of 
existing literature made clear, there is no consensus on the ownership of the pub-
lic debt. With patchy empirical evidence based on snapshots of data, some have 
claimed that the public debt is widely held while others claim it is heavily con-
centrated. An analysis of the ownership distribution of the public debt therefore 
provides an effective starting point for my alternative analysis. Figure 2 offers 
what is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to map the long-term historical share 
of the public debt that is held by the top one per cent of US households (ranked 
by net worth).
8 
In 1922, ownership was heavily concentrated with the top one per cent own-
ing 45 per cent of the public debt. This ownership share fell gradually over the 
course of the next four decades, and reached its nadir, at least according to the 
available data, of 17 per cent in 1969. In 1983, the next year for which data is 
available, the ownership share of the top one per cent increased to 33 per cent. 
And by 2010, the last year for which data is available, the ownership share of the 
top one per cent approached the level of 1922, climbing to 42 per cent. Figure 2 
already reveals some cracks in the arguments suggesting that the public debt has 
become widely held. As far as the level of concentration is concerned, in 2010, 
the ownership share of the top one per cent is nearing the highs of the 1920s. 
Expanding beyond snapshots and looking at the dynamic or historical rate of 
concentration, the existing data in Figure 2 suggest that there has been a rapid 
increase in the ownership share of the top one per cent over the past four dec-
ades. However, any claims we make about the historical pattern of public debt 
ownership concentration must be tempered by the fact that the data in Figure 2 
are incomplete (see Appendix). In particular the 1970s present an empirical 
blind spot as no data are available for public debt ownership concentration dur-
ing this decade. Put simply, the nadir of ownership concentration may have 
come sometime in the 1970s rather than in 1969. And if that were the case, then 
the upward trend towards concentration highlighted in Figure 2 could span three 
decades instead of four. Missing data should always make us err on the side of 
caution.  
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And with this in mind, we can say that over the past three decades at least the 
top one per cent has rapidly increased its ownership share in the public debt. 
This steady upward trend towards concentration takes place through the so-
called neoliberal phase, starting in the 1980s, through to the current global fi-
nancial crisis. 
In order to deepen the analysis, Table 2 disaggregates the category of public 
debt further and measures the top one per cent share of various types of federal 
government bonds alongside other major asset categories. The table shows that 
the level of concentration of federal government bonds as a whole has historical-
ly been lower than for corporate stocks and corporate bonds, but much higher 
than for life insurance plans and pension assets. Ownership concentration for 
savings bonds is very low, approximating the levels of the most widely held fi-
nancial assets. The limited data available for bond funds indicates a similarly 
diffuse pattern of ownership until 2010 when the ownership share of the top one 
per cent increased dramatically. When it comes to other US federal government 
bonds, the level of concentration is comparable to the levels for corporate stocks 
and corporate bonds. 
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Figure 2 The Top 1% Share of the Public Debt 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearlly by connecting adjacent 
observations. See data appendix for further details.  
 
Source: Lampman (1962) for 1922-1961; the Federal Reserve's Survey 
of Consumer Finances for 1962-1968, 1970-2010; the IRS's Personal 
Wealth Report for the 1% share of the public debt in 1969: 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/69inpwar.pdf 
Smith (1974) for individual ownership of the public debt in 1969.  
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Table 2 Breakdown of the Top 1% Ownership of Financial Assets (percentage share) 
  1922 1953 1962 1983 1992 2001 2010 
Total Federal Bonds 45 31.8 24.6 33.6 28.7 36.7 42.0 
Other Federal Bonds*     87.4 39.9 52.3 59.6 72.9 
Federal Bond Funds         16.1 15.3 47.1 
Savings Bonds     8.6 12.7 9.1 18.5 7.8 
Corporate Stocks 61.5 76 61.0 56.8 48.8 52.8 51.3 
Corporate Bonds 69.2 77.5 39.0 57.1 68.7 64.3 68.7 
Life Insurance 35.3 11.5 12.4 14.8 7.3 12.7 21.2 
Pension Assets 8 5.5 4.6 8.5 14.3 13.7 15.3 
 
*Includes all Federal securities (notes, bills, certificates) other than savings bonds.  
 
Source: For 1922 and 1953, Lampman (1962); For 1962-2010, Federal Reserve’s Survey 
of Consumer Finances.  
 
Table 2 gives some insights into why the misleading image of a widely held 
public debt persists. Recall from the discussion above the arguments made by 
Francis Cavanaugh, who backs up his assertion that the public debt is widely 
held by claiming that most direct holdings of the public debt by US individuals 
and households comes in the form of savings bonds. As Table 2 shows, house-
hold ownership of savings bonds is indeed very diffuse. Savings bonds were in-
troduced in the 1930s with the express purpose of ‘democratizing’ public fi-
nance (Tufano and Schneider 2005: 2). Offering a safe and secure asset in small-
er denominations, savings bonds were meant to appeal to lower and middle class 
households. During World War II, propaganda posters called on ordinary Amer-
icans to fulfil their patriotic duty by investing in war savings bonds, a move that 
not only would ensure ally victory, but that would also help ensure financial se-
curity for the bondholders. In the 1950s and 1960s, ‘national bond drives’ head-
ed by NASA, as well as Hollywood and Broadway celebrities, continued to play 
on patriotic sentiments, urging Americans to ‘underwrite’ the might of the US 
government by investing in savings bonds (US Department of the Treasury 
1991: 36–46). Most personal encounters with the public debt are likely to come 
from investment in savings bonds or, at least for older generations, from expo-
sure to these high profile campaigns. And so it is little wonder that the image of 
a widely held public debt comes from its association with mass investment in 
savings bonds. 
This image, however, is a relic of a distant past. In the brave new world of 
complex and highly vendible finance, savings bonds have been dying a rapid 
death. According to flow of funds data, savings bonds on average accounted for 
just over 20 per cent of the outstanding net public debt in the postwar period 
(1945–70). By the 1980s, this share fell to just over six per cent and has fallen 
steadily ever since. In 2011, savings bonds made up a meagre 1.8 per cent of the 
public debt. Thus the U-shaped pattern of concentration that we witnessed in 
Figure 2 can at least in part be explained by the replacement over the past four 
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decades of widely held savings bonds with more heavily concentrated types of 
federal government bonds. 
How does inequity in the ownership of the public debt compare to the distri-
bution of wealth in general? Much has been made in recent years about growing 
wealth inequality in the US. In his pioneering study in the mid-1990s, Edward 
Wolff (1996) unveiled a U-shaped pattern in the share of wealth of the top one 
per cent of US households in the twentieth century. Wolff demonstrated that the 
top one per cent share of wealth had increased rapidly starting in the 1980s, 
leading him to proclaim that the distribution of wealth in the US had become 
increasingly ‘top heavy’.  
Figure 3 charts the top one per cent ownership of the public debt alongside its 
share of net wealth. 
 
 
 
The thin dashed series reproduces the research results from Edward Wolff’s 
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Figure 3 Top Heavy: The Top 1% Share of Net Wealth and the Public 
Debt 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearlly by connecting adjacent 
observations.  
 
Source: For public debt, see Figure 2; For net wealth, Wolff (1996, 2010) 
cited in Domhoff (2012): 
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html  
The observation for 2010 is based on my own calculation from the 
Federal Reserve's 2010 Survey of Consumer Finance.  
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original study, as well as some of his subsequent studies that have updated this 
research to 2007, and which I update to 2010. As is clear in Figure 3, the top one 
per cent share of the public debt follows more or less the same U-shaped pattern 
as its share of wealth in general. The results are clear: if wealth distribution is to 
be deemed increasingly ‘top heavy’, so too is the ownership of the public debt. 
In fact, in the context of the current crisis, concentration in the ownership of the 
public debt has increased much more rapidly than the concentration of wealth. 
Whether we treat the public debt in relation to other financial assets, or in re-
lation to wealth more generally, we cannot escape the fact that the top one per 
cent of households has rapidly increased its ownership share since the postwar 
period. Using the top one per cent as a proxy for Adams’s bondholding class, we 
see that over the past three decades at least, the power of this class has been rap-
idly resurgent. This power of the bondholding class has augmented at the ex-
pense of small-time investors or ‘John Q. Public’. 
 
Mapping redistribution 
 
What are the underlying consequences of this growing concentration in the own-
ership of the public debt? As the existing literature makes clear, one of the most 
important implications of increased concentration in the ownership of federal 
bonds lies in the effect it has in redistributing income. Once again, the existing 
literature has come to no consensus on this issue. Those who claim that the pub-
lic debt has become widely held accept, by definition, that the distribution of 
interest income on federal bonds is also diffused, and in turn claim that the pub-
lic debt redistributes income progressively from wealthy taxpayers to lower and 
middle class public creditors. Meanwhile those who claim that the distribution 
of the public debt and the interest income that derives from it are heavily con-
centrated, claim that the public debt redistributes income regressively from low-
er and middle class taxpayers to wealth public creditors. 
The underlying issue can be summarised as follows. Ownership of federal 
government bonds confers public creditors with exclusionary power over the 
stream of interest payments on those bonds. If the group that receives the interest 
payments on the public debt (that is, the public creditors) is not the same as the 
group that pays the taxes that finances those interest payments (that is, the tax-
payers), then the public debt will serve as a mode of redistribution from the lat-
ter to the former. So in order to analyse the possible redistributive effects of the 
public debt, it is first necessary to map the distribution of federal interest pay-
ments. In accounting terminology, the ‘stock’ of federal bonds (wealth) provides 
public creditors with a ‘flow’ of interest payments (income). 
Since Wolff’s study of wealth inequality, other researchers have unearthed 
similar U-shaped patterns in the distribution of income in the US (see Piketty 
and Saez 2003). Piketty and Saez’s (2003) historical data on income distribution 
are plotted alongside my own estimate of the distribution of federal interest 
payments in Figure 4. As is clear in Figure 4, the distribution of federal interest 
payments mirrors the U-shaped distribution of income much like the distribution 
of federal bonds mirrors the distribution of wealth. But in order to examine the 
redistributive effects of this pattern of distribution, we need to know precisely 
whose taxes are financing the top one per cent share of federal interest. This task 
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of measuring the redistributive effects of the public debt is much more difficult 
than the existing literature would have us believe. 
 
 The few existing studies that attempt to measure the redistributive effects of 
the public debt offer some comparison of the share of federal interest received 
by top income groups relative to the amount top income groups pay in total fed-
eral taxes or in federal income tax (Miller 1950; Cohen 1951). Yet the problem 
with these existing measures is two-fold. First, these measures overlook some of 
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Figure 4 The Top 1% Share of Income and Federal Interest Income 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearlly by connecting adjacent 
observations. From 1922-1961, the top 1% share of federal interest is 
assumed to be equal to the top 1% share of the public debt. From 
1962-2010, interest payments for both the top 1% and all debt holders are 
imputed by multiplying the dollar value of different types of Treasury 
securities held by the group (savings bonds, ‘other’ federal others and 
‘bond funds’) by their corresponding year-end interest rate, and then 
adding the sum of these products. 
 
Source: For ownership of the public debt, see Figure 2. For interest rates, 
the US Treasury's Monthly Statement of the Public Debt reports: 
(http:/www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/mspd.htm). For the 
top 1% share of income, The World Top Incomes Database:  
(http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/). 
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the technical aspects of government accounting. Although interest payments 
constitute an important component of federal expenditures, there is technically 
no way to determine precisely who pays the taxes that finance interest payments 
on the public debt.
9
 This problem stems from the fact that in government budget 
accounting there is not a particular subset of taxes ‘earmarked’ for government 
debt servicing (see Bell 2000; Wray 2012). 
 The second and far more glaring problem is that the share of taxes paid by 
the top one per cent is a questionable indicator of the progressivity of the federal 
tax system. From introductory economics textbooks to more advanced studies, 
the progressivity of taxation is generally defined in relation to the ability to pay 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 2001: 39; Suits 1977).
10
 A useful definition of tax 
progressivity is offered by Piketty and Saez (2007: 4), who state that a ‘progres-
sive tax is one in which the share of income paid in taxes rises with income’. As 
such, there is a broad-based consensus that the progressivity of the tax system is 
not determined by the share of taxes paid by the top one per cent but by the tax 
rate that the top one per cent pays as a percentage of its income relative to lower 
income groups. The effective tax rate, or the amount of tax paid as a percentage 
of taxable income, is therefore a more appropriate measure of tax progressivity 
than the share of taxes paid by the top one per cent.
11 
One way around these measurement problems is to estimate and compare the 
share of the top one per cent in gross (before-tax) federal interest payments to 
this group’s share in net (after-tax) share federal interest payments (Piketty and 
Saez 2007: 5).
12
 Though there is no way to determine with any precision whose 
taxes finance whose interest payments, it is nevertheless possible to get a sense 
of the role that the federal income tax system plays in redistributing the interest 
income received by the top one per cent. A progressive federal income tax sys-
tem will make the federal net interest share of the top one per cent smaller than 
its gross interest share (the difference between the gross and net shares will be 
positive). A regressive federal income tax system will make the federal interest 
share of the top one per cent greater than its gross share (the difference between 
the gross and net shares will be negative). A neutral federal income tax system 
will keep the net and gross federal interest share of the top one per cent the 
same. 
Expressed in dynamic or historical terms, an increasing gap between the top 
one per cent gross and net shares of the federal interest will indicate an increas-
ingly progressive federal income tax system; a narrowing gap between the top 
one per cent gross and net shares of the federal interest will indicate an decreas-
ingly progressive federal income tax system; and a steady gap between the top 
one per cent gross and net shares of federal interest will indicate a federal in-
come tax system whose progressivity remains unchanged. 
Figure 5 uses this template to gauge the effects of the federal tax system on 
the distribution of federal interest income. The top two series measure the gross 
and net share of federal interest received by the top one per cent, while the bot-
tom series is a ratio of the top one per cent net and gross shares of federal inter-
est. The closer the ratio is to 1, the less substantial the impact of the federal in-
come tax system on the distribution of federal interest income. Fluctuations in 
the ratio at the bottom of Figure 5 give us an indication of the changing effects 
of the federal income tax system on the distribution of federal interest income: 
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when the ratio is rising/falling, the tax system becomes more/less progressive. 
 
In the 1960s, the ratio of the net to gross interest shares moved sideways, in-
dicating that the federal income tax system had neutral effects on the distribution 
of federal interest income. The data in Figure 5 suggest that in the 1970s the fed-
eral income tax system became more progressive, as the net interest share fell 
relative to the gross share. But again, missing data forces us to avoid making any 
definitive claims about this decade. In the 1980s, the federal income tax system 
became less progressive, as the ratio of net to gross interest began to trend 
downwards. In the next decade or so, the federal income tax system once again 
had increasingly progressive effects, as the ratio followed an upward trend. In 
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Figure 5 Giving and Receiving: Gross versus Net Federal Interest 
Income 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated from the trend growth rate. The net 
share of interest is calculated by multiplying the top 1% share of total 
gross interest by the differential complements of the income tax rate 
(see note 8).  
 
Source: For the top 1% share of federal interest, see Figure 4. For the 
effective tax rate from 1962-2004, Piketty and Saez (2007):  
(http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/).  
From 2005-2009, the IRS Statistics of Income:  
(http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12inwinbulratesshare.pdf).  
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the early- to mid-2000s the ratio began to trend sharply downwards. In the con-
text of the current crisis, the ratio has begun to trend upwards. This is unsurpris-
ing given that the incomes of households in the bottom 99 per cent, and there-
fore the rate at which they are taxed have fallen significantly since 2007, while 
the tax rates of the top one per cent declined only slightly or not at all. 
As we can see from the ratio series in Figure 5, the effect of the federal in-
come tax system on the distribution of federal interest income has fluctuated 
historically. Over the long term, however, the effect of federal income tax on the 
distribution of federal interest income has been fairly constant. Over the past 
five decades, keeping in mind the empirical blind spot of the 1970s, the gap be-
tween the net and gross series has widened, but only very slightly. Meanwhile 
the distribution of federal interest has become rapidly concentrated. 
In broad terms, there has been a massive concentration in the distribution of 
federal interest towards the top one per cent, while at the same time the federal 
income tax system has done little to offset the growing inequity in the distribu-
tion of federal interest payments. Put another way, what the top one per cent 
gives to the federal government in income taxes as a percentage of its income 
has, at least since the early 1980s, failed to keep pace with what it receives in 
federal interest payments. 
 
Intra-governmental debt 
 
There is still one more argument that ardent naysayers could potentially invoke 
to downplay the regressive dynamics of distribution and redistribution that un-
derpin the public debt. Recall one key argument made by orthodox Keynesian 
Francis Cavanaugh (1996: 68), who suggested that the holdings of the public 
debt in federal government trust fund accounts such as Social Security, Medicare 
and Medicaid represent the interests of ordinary Americans or ‘John Q. Public’. 
Intra-governmental debt is a peculiar outcome of the government budget ac-
counting process. The public debt held in government trust fund accounts repre-
sents the accumulated surpluses in the federal government trust funds. Unlike 
general government revenues and expenses where there is no one to one corre-
spondence between revenues and the expenses they fund, government trust 
funds are budget accounting devices that ‘earmark’ certain types of taxes to cor-
responding expenditures (see Wray 2004). For example, federal payroll taxes are 
earmarked specifically for the Social Security trust fund account. When the 
amount the federal government takes in from payroll taxes exceeds what it pays 
out in social security benefits, the social security trust fund account accumulates 
a surplus, which the federal government is required by law to invest in special 
interest-bearing Treasury securities. Intra-governmental holdings of the public 
debt are significant. In 2011, they stood at US$4.6 trillion, equivalent to nearly 
half the US$10 trillion of the public debt held by private investors. 
 How, then, do we go about exploring empirically Cavanaugh’s claim that 
these substantial intra-governmental holdings somehow benefit ordinary Ameri-
cans? And what bearing would this empirical exploration have on our analysis of 
the regressive dynamics of private household ownership of the public debt out-
lined above? 
In and of itself, the overall level of intra-governmental debt tells us nothing 
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about the underlying interests that are served by it. But technically speaking, 
when the federal government pays out social security benefits and other forms of 
transfer payments, what it does is cash in some of the Treasury securities from 
its trust fund account to pay out transfer payments to individuals and families in 
dollars and cents. It is therefore possible to examine the disaggregate flow of 
transfer payments in order to determine indirectly whose interests are served by 
intra-governmental holdings of the public debt. In the context of this analysis, 
the bottom 99 per cent of households has served as a proxy for the ordinary 
Americans or ‘John Q. Public’. In short, if the bottom 99 per cent of households 
receives the bulk of government transfer payments, then intra-governmental debt 
would indeed serve ordinary Americans rather than the top one per cent bond-
holding class. 
A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office (2012) on income ine-
quality offers a rare glimpse into the distribution of government transfer pay-
ments since 1979. The CBO data indicate that the share of transfer payments 
received by the top one per cent of households has changed little over the past 
three decades. Since 1979, the top one per cent has received on average a paltry 
0.89 per cent of transfer payments, and this share fell even further to 0.68 per 
cent in 2009. As a result, there is really no question that over the past three dec-
ades intra-governmental debt has been an institution that serves the interests of 
the bottom 99 per cent. 
But the fact that the bulk of transfer payments flow to the bottom 99 per cent 
of households should not lead us to overstate the role of intra-governmental debt 
as a progressive redistributive force. The reason for this can be seen once we 
start to break down the distribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99 
per cent. Though the 99 per cent has in recent years become a catchall category 
used to distinguish the majority from the wealthy elite, it is, in reality, a very 
diverse group with its own hierarchical structure. The bottom 99 per cent in-
cludes social groups ranging from the ‘power belt’ of professionals in the 90th to 
99th percentiles of income distribution that ‘surrounds, serves and protects’ the 
top one per cent (Bichler et al. 2012: 5), all the way down to the 46 million 
Americans that live below the poverty line (Denavas-Walt et al. 2012: 13). And 
once we take into account the hierarchical structure within the bottom 99 per 
cent into our analysis of the distribution of transfer payments, then we see that 
sweeping transformations have taken place over the past three decades. 
Figure 6 offers a breakdown of the CBO data on the distribution of transfer 
payments within the bottom 99 per cent of households. Specifically, the figure is 
divided into two broad categories: the thin line shows the share of transfer pay-
ments received by households in the 60th to the 99th percentiles of income dis-
tribution (that is, the top 40 per cent minus the top one per cent), while the thick 
line shows the share of transfer payments received by households in the bottom 
40 per cent. The CBO data indicates that the share of government transfer pay-
ments received by the upper strata of US households has increased modestly 
over the past three decades from 15 per cent in 1979 to 20 per cent in 2009. 
Meanwhile, households in the bottom 40 per cent saw their share of transfer 
payments fall from 73 per cent to 63 per cent over the same period. The fall has 
been particularly dramatic for households that are most likely to rely on gov-
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ernment transfers for survival, with the share of transfer payments received by 
households in the bottom 20 per cent falling markedly from 54 to 40 per cent 
from 1979 to 2009. 
 
 Invoking intra-governmental debt to downplay the distributive and redistribu-
tive dynamics of the public debt turns out to be rather misleading. It is true that 
the top one per cent of households has never had much of a stake in the transfer 
payments that flow from the intra-governmental debt held in government trust 
fund accounts. And in this sense the intra-governmental portion of the public 
debt can be said to broadly represent the interests of the bottom 99 per cent of 
households. Yet once we begin to dig deeper and break down the distribution of 
transfer payments within the bottom 99 per cent, we see that over the past three 
decades intra-governmental debt has, if anything, intensified social inequality 
and polarisation. 
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Figure 6 Transfer Payments and the Bottom 99% 
 
Note: Transfers include federal, state and local government cash (e.g. 
social security) payments and in-kind (e.g. voucher) payments.  
 
Source: The Congressional Budget Office (2012):  
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43373 
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4. Conclusions 
 
In the 1940s, the early Keynesians theorists of the public debt were willing to 
acknowledge the potentially negative consequences of their policy prescriptions. 
An expansionary fiscal policy would lead to a growing public debt that in turn 
would, if large enough, be swallowed up by the rich. Unless kept in check by 
progressive taxation, the unequal distribution of federal bonds, early Keynesians 
feared, would redistribute income regressively. Government fiscal policy, origi-
nally intended to make capitalist markets more humane and stable, would in-
stead be beholden to the interests of wealthy Americans; a ‘top heavy’ distribu-
tion of the public debt would eventually stifle, rather than stimulate, effective 
demand. 
Yet early Keynesians always considered this a hypothetical situation, and ar-
gued that circumstances in the mid-twentieth century would ensure that these 
negative threats would not materialise. Indeed, the empirical record for the 
postwar period, as evidenced by previous studies and by the research I have pre-
sented here, indicates that the early Keynesians were justified not to worry about 
these negative consequences. The image of a powerful bondholding class looked 
to be a relic of the late nineteenth century. In the 1950s and 1960s the public 
debt had become more widely held than in previous decades. And there was lit-
tle evidence to suggest that the public debt served to redistribute income regres-
sively. 
Since at least the early 1980s, however, disregarding the distributive and re-
distributive dimensions of the public debt has become ever more indefensible. 
As I have shown here, the distribution of federal bonds and the interest income 
on them, much like the distribution of wealth and income more generally, has 
become increasingly unequal over at least the past three decades. The federal 
income tax system and the growing intra-governmental debt held in federal trust 
fund accounts have done little to reduce inequality. In short, all the hypothetical 
fears of early Keynesians have become a reality in contemporary US capitalism. 
In the past three decades the public debt has come to serve as an institution of 
power working in the interests of the top one per cent. In the current context 
there is simply no evidence to support the claim made by contemporary ortho-
dox Keynesians that the public debt serves the interests of ‘John Q. Public’. 
Though much has changed since Adams’s time, the analysis presented here indi-
cates that there is indeed still a powerful bondholding class in the US, one whose 
power has augmented rapidly over the past three decades. 
Even the most conservative measures indicate that pre-tax inequality has in-
creased rapidly over the past three decades and that government, through the 
institution of the public debt, has in important ways intensified and reinforced 
this trend towards greater inequality. With wealth and income inequality reach-
ing the high levels of 1920s, any further increases to the public debt that are pur-
chased domestically are likely to be absorbed by the rich. Such additions would 
push inequality in the distribution of federal bonds to a level that is without 
precedent, at least in the past century for which reliable data is available. 
The situation, therefore, is potentially explosive and raises the question of 
how much further this trend toward concentration in the ownership of the public 
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debt can continue without encountering any fundamental resistance from the 
bottom 99 per cent. And that in turn raises the related question of whether any 
concerted efforts to reverse this concentration in the ownership of public debt 
can occur without facing any counter-resistance from the bondholding class. 
Given the paltry empirical record of the existing literature, it is no wonder 
that the role of public debt in directly reinforcing and intensifying inequality is 
conspicuously absent from debates about growing wealth and inequality in the 
US. The power-centred approach I have developed here suggests that govern-
ment does not just externally ‘mediate’ the income and wealth inequalities gen-
erated by the market. Instead, my research suggests that government, primarily 
through the institution of public debt, along with capitalist markets, have be-
come enfolded in the same power processes of distribution and redistribution; 
power processes that increasingly favour those at the very top of the hierarchy of 
power (Bichler and Nitzan 2012b: 48). By mapping the dynamics of distribution 
and redistribution that underpin the public debt we gain a better understanding of 
the possibilities for, and also the barriers to, more progressive alternatives to a 
political economic regime that a growing number of people now believe works 
in the interest of the top one per cent. 
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1. An important part of Hamilton’s (1790: 15–21) plan called for the federal government to assume the debts 
incurred by individual states during the Revolutionary War. As John Steele Gordon (2010: 26–30) points 
out, these debts, incurred mostly in Northern States, were held largely by a powerful oligarchy whose ‘. . . 
loyalties lay mainly with their respective states and the cozy local societies in which they had grown up’. 
Part of Hamilton’s rationale for federal assumption of state debts, at least according to Gordon (2010: 28), 
was to shift the oligarchy’s loyalties to the federal government (see also Beard 1914). 
2.   The account in this paragraph relies on Macdonald (2003: 392–9). 
3.  Cooke’s role in financing the Civil War is told in Matthew Josephson’s (1934: 53–8) masterful history of 
US capitalism. It was likely Cooke that Marx (1867: 940) had in mind when he proclaimed that the Civil 
War had led to ‘the creation of a finance aristocracy of the vilest type’. 
4.  Robert E. Wright (2008: 162) accuses Adams of underestimating ‘. . . for political gain the dispersion of 
the national debt as it then stood’. The main reason for the underestimation, Wright (2008: 162; emphasis 
added) claims, is that Adams measured concentration only in ‘registered’ federal debt, ‘which was proba-
bly more concentrated than ownership of the government’s [unregistered] bearer bonds’. But alas, Wright 
does not make any attempt to estimate, even roughly, how unregistered bonds would alter the pattern of 
ownership concentration. Without even a rough estimate, one could just as easily accuse Wright of under-
estimating Adams’s findings for his own ‘political gain’. 
5.  Instead, political economists in the postwar period became preoccupied with debating whether the public 
debt redistributes wealth and income between ‘generations’ (see Buchanan 1958; Ferguson 1964). 
6.  The theoretical and historical dimensions of public indebtedness are explored in more detail in my PhD 
dissertation, Public Debt, Ownership and Power: The Political Economy of Distribution and Redistribu-
tion (forthcoming 2013), York University. 
7.  In a recent interview with Tim Di Muzio, Nitzan and Bichler (Bichler et al. 2012: 5) argue that a narrow 
focus on the top one per cent of households does not tell us everything about the ruling class and dominant 
capital, but it does offer ‘. . . an indirect proxy for capitalist power’. 
8.  The Survey of Consumer Finance data that Figure 2 is based on include the total direct holdings of federal 
securities by households as well as some of the indirect holdings in federal bond funds. 
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9.  According to the Office of Management and Budget, since 1980, the ‘net interest’ paid by the federal 
government has on average accounted for 14 per cent of current expenditures, and represented about two-
thirds of the amount dedicated to military spending. Over this same period, the amount paid by the federal 
government in interest has on average equaled about 27 per cent of total federal tax receipts. In the context 
of the current crisis, historically low yields on federal bonds mean that the federal government’s interest 
expenses, even despite the massive build-up in debt, have been held in check (see also Johnson and Kwak 
2012). OMB data indicates that, from 2007 to 2012, net interest payments on average accounted for nine 
per cent of total federal government expenditures, 19 per cent of military spending and 21 per cent of fed-
eral tax revenues. 
10.  Political economists have long grappled with the normative foundations of progressive taxation. In the 
seventeenth century William Petty (1623–87), a disciple of Hobbes and one of the founders of political 
economy, argued that the state exists to protect private property and that individuals should therefore be 
prepared to contribute taxes in direct proportion to their individual property (Roll 1942: 102–3). Accord-
ing to the logic of this argument, the more property one owns, the more state protection one needs and, in 
turn, the more taxes one should pay.  
11.  A simple arithmetic example can be used to illustrate the differences in using the share of taxes paid and 
the effective tax rate as measures of tax progressivity. Let’s assume that the total tax bill in society A is 
US$100 and that the top one per cent of households pays US$50 or 50 per cent of that tax bill. Let’s also 
assume that the distribution of income in society A is fairly equitable: out of a total societal income of 
US$1000, the top one per cent holds US$100 or a 10 per cent share. In society A, the top one per cent 
share of taxes paid equals 50 per cent and its effective tax rate also equals 50 per cent. Now let’s envision 
another society (society B) that is similar to society A in every respect except for the distribution of in-
come. Of the total societal income of US$1000 in society B, let’s assume that the top one per cent holds 
US$500 or a 50 per cent share. The tax bill in society B is also US$100, and the top one per cent continues 
to pay US$50 or 50 per cent of total taxes. The top one per cent share of taxes paid in society B still equals 
US$50, or a 50 per cent share of taxes paid, but its effective tax rate is only 10 per cent. As a result, the tax 
systems of even the most wildly unequal societies could in principle be deemed progressive if we use the 
share of taxes paid as our measure of tax progressivity. 
12.  The net share of the top one per cent in federal interest is calculated as follows: 
top 1% federal gross interest received
total federal gross interest received
 ×  
1 −  top 1% effective federal income tax rate
1 −  average effective federal income tax rate
 
13.  Lampman (1962) also includes estimates of the top one per cent ownership of various types of wealth for 
1929 and 1939. Yet the data observations for these years seem to radically over-estimate the share of 
wealth held by the top one per cent. For federal bonds, Lampman’s estimates suggest that the top one per 
cent in 1929 and 1939 held 100 per cent and 91 per cent, respectively. For state and local bonds, Lamp-
man’s estimate even suggests that the top one per cent held more than 100 per cent for both of these years. 
Lampman (1962: 209) suggests that these irregularities may be due to a number of factors, including sam-
pling errors and double counting of assets. I exclude the data for 1929 and 1939 from my analysis for these 
reasons. 
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Appendix 
 
Though the time series in Figure 2 spans from 1922 to 2010, it is based on ob-
servations for only 15 years. The data for the missing years are interpolated line-
arly, by connecting adjacent observations. Data on the top one per cent share of 
the public debt for 1922, 1945, 1949 and 1953 are from Robert J. Lampman’s 
(1962) pioneering study The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth, 
1922–56, which in turn relies on federal estate tax data from the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS).
13
 The data for 1969 are pieced together from two sources: for 
the top one per cent holdings of the public debt (the numerator), I rely on the 
1969 IRS Personal Wealth Report, again based on IRS estate tax data, and for 
the total amount of public debt held by individuals (the denominator), I rely on 
the estimates of James D. Smith (1974: 174). The data for 1962, 1983, 1989, 
1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 are based on my own analysis of 
micro-data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances. 
Figure 2 thus relies on two main data sources: the IRS federal estate tax data-
base (ETD) and the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). 
There are two important differences between these two sets of data. First, the 
primary unit of observation for SCF data is the household and includes all of the 
interdependent adults living at the same residence, while the primary unit of the 
ETD is the individual (Johnson and Moore 2005: 82). Second, the SCF data is 
survey based, while the ETD is based on information gathered from estate tax 
filings with the IRS. 
The SCF consists of a two-part survey design: ‘a standard, geographically 
based random sample and a special oversample of relatively wealthy families’ 
(Bricker et al. 2012: 3). The most recent 2010 SCF is based on a sample of 6492 
US households, which contains detailed questions about household income, sav-
ings and net worth, as well as the composition of their assets and liabilities 
(Bricker et al. 2012: 3). Data compiled for the ETD are based on estate tax fil-
ings with the IRS. In 2010, descendants were required to file estate tax returns if 
the gross assets in the estate exceeded US$5 million and there were just over 
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15,000 that reached this filing threshold. In their filings, descendants are re-
quired to report in detail the components of income and the asset composition of 
the gross estate. Both data sources use multiplier variables for each group to 
‘blow up’ the data sample to represent its corresponding size in the US popula-
tion as a whole. 
Despite the differences in the purpose and design of both data sets, Johnson 
and Moore (2005: 87–96) suggest that the statistics of SCF and the ETD in gen-
eral, and in regards to the measurement of ownership concentration in particular, 
‘compare quite favorably’. Johnson and Moore (2005: 96) go on to conclude that 
SCF and the ETD are ‘complimentary sources of data on both wealth and in-
come’. As such, it seems reasonable to splice together data from these two dif-
ferent sources in order to develop a long-term historical time series of the top 
one per cent ownership share of the public debt. 
